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  We consider a simple model of innovation where equilibrium cycles may arise 
and show that, whenever actual capital accumulation falls below its balanced growth 
path, subsidizing innovators by taxing consumers has stabilizing effects, promotes 
sustained growth and increases welfare. Further, if the steady state is unstable under 
laissez faire, the introduction of the subsidy can make the steady state stable. Such a 
policy has beneficial effects as it fosters output growth along the transitional 
adjustment path, and increases the welfare of current and future generations. 
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 1 Introduction
It is well known that processes of growth based solely on factor accumulation cease
at some point because of diminishing returns to scale of production. By contrast,
introducing innovative products may create new opportunities on the production
side. Innovation may be induced by the prospect of enjoying temporary monopoly
proﬁts. Such temporary monopoly power makes the law of diminishing returns to
scale vanish and growth based on innovation sustainable [see e.g. the seminal papers
by Romer (1986, 1990) and, for a general overview, Aghion and Howitt (1997)]. The
stability properties of such a sustainable balanced growth path have been exten-
sively studied in the literature. In particular, authors like Shleifer (1986), Aghion
and Howitt (1992), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Matsuyama (1999) and Francois
and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) have demonstrated the existence of equilibrium endogenous
ﬂuctuations and, more speciﬁcally, deterministic cycles within diﬀerent models of
innovation. In Shleifer (1986) equilibrium cycles arise due to strategic complemen-
tarities between innovators. In Aghion and Howitt (1992) the occurrence of cycles
is linked to the negative dependence of current research upon future research. In
Deneckere and Judd (1992) and Matsuyama (1999) equilibrium cycles arise due to
the non linear dependence between incentives to innovate and the current level of
innovations. That is, increases in variety of goods today induce imitation in later
periods and these periods of imitation do not foster innovation; incentives for future
innovation occur when goods’ variety will start declining. More recently, Francois
and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) have developed a model in which clustering of implemen-
tation and innovation is endogenous and a stable cyclical equilibrium may emerge
along the balanced growth path. In their model, such a cyclical equilibrium trajec-
tory has higher average growth, but lower welfare than the stationary equilibrium
trajectory.
In this article, we draw on the insights of the above mentioned literature to
investigate the stabilizing (destabilizing) eﬀects of policies aimed at eliminating
1cycles in innovative activity, and their implications on growth and welfare. Our
work is closer in spirit to Mastuyama (1999) which focuses on the asynchronicity
of innovation and investment activities. In his work, as in Deneckere and Judd
(1992), what is crucial is the timing of entry of innovators into the market for new
goods. To start up production innovators need to ensure that the market for their
product is suﬃciently large to recoup the costs of innovation, and since they enjoy
monopoly rents only for one period, innovators introduce new products into the
market at the same time as their competitors. Delaying entry would mean losing
temporary monopoly rents and make innovation not proﬁtable enough. Therefore,
innovative activities take place at the same time, and prevail until competition
among innovators builds up and monopoly rents drop. As the economy becomes
more competitive, more resources are available to manufacturing activities, and
both output and investment growth increase. Higher output and investment will,
in turn, build up a larger resource base in the economy, which stimulates another
period of innovative activity. In this model, under empirically plausible conditions,
the balanced growth path is unstable and the economy achieves sustainable growth
through cycles, perpetually moving back and forth between two phases. In one
phase, when the growth rates of output and investment are higher, there is no
innovation. The economy is then competitive and the evolution of this economy
is the one pointed out by Solow. In the other phase, when the growth rates of
output and investment are lower, there is innovation and the economy is ”more
monopolistic” as in the Schumpeterian endogenous growth approach. In the long
run, the growth rates of innovation and investment are equal, however they do
not follow the same evolution: they move over the cycle in an a-synchronized way.
That is, the economy alternates between periods of high innovation and periods
of high investment.1 These phenomena should not be interpreted as short run
1Periods of high innovation are followed by periods of high investment, and in each phase of the
economy either innovation or capital accumulation play the dominant role. Moreover, as shown
by Matsuyama (1996, 1999) when the economy moves back and forth between the two phases
growth is faster than along the (unstable) balanced growth path.
2business cycles but, rather, as long-cycles induced by the clustering over time of
entrepreneurial innovation.
The main contribution of our analysis, particularly with respect to the work
of Matsuyama (1999) or Deneckere and Judd (1992), is to uncover both positive
and normative implications of simple tax/subsidy policies to control for innovation
driven cycles. We deﬁne stabilization policy as a policy that moves the economy from
an unstable regime to a stable regime.2 The focus on stabilization originates from
the observation that nations and governments aim, when possible, at reaching high
permanent growth without incurring into prolonged periods of low or no growth (i.e.,
slumps). We concentrate our attention on the issue of how subsidizing innovators
(and taxing consumers) can generate stable sustained growth and higher welfare.
In this respect, our paper can also be seen as a reformulation in a macroeco-
nomic context of the branch of the R&D literature that deals with public aid to
innovation (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1992), Davidson and Segerstrom (1998)
and Segerstrom (2000)). In this literature it is often claimed that there exists a role
for public intervention both in subsidizing R&D activities and enforcing property
rights to innovation as means to promote economic growth. We wish to add a new
macroeconomic perspective to this claim: we show that in fast growing economies,
in which high factor accumulation plays a crucial role alongside innovative sectors
that enjoy temporary rents,3 governments should follow an unorthodox approach
when facing prolonged periods of slow growth. Namely, they should reallocate re-
2This macroeconomic concept of ’stabilisation policy’ was pioneered by Grandmont (1985,
1986) and then developed by many authors. See, for instance, Judd and Deneckere (1992), Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (1997), Guo and Lansing (1998), Christiano and Harrison (1999), Aloi et al.
(2002).
3What we have in mind here are economies like Japan and East Asian newly industrialised
countries (NICs) like South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. Japan experienced fast
growth since the aftermath of the second World War until the early 1990s. Until the 1960s
the main engine of growth was undoubtedly rapid factor accumulation; from the 1960s until the
1990s the main engine of growth of Japanese economy can be identiﬁed as the development and
expansion of high technology industry (see Odagiri and Goto (1993)). As regards East Asian
NICs, a large part of their growth until 1990 was driven by rapid factor accumulation (see Young
(1995)). However, there is extensive evidence of the emerging role of high tech industry such as
semiconductor industry in East Asian Economies (see Mathews and Cho (2000)).
3sources from consumers to the innovative sectors. Our paper also demonstrates
that a tax on innovators, aimed at raising resources available to consumers during
economic slumps, is detrimental. On the one hand it can be destabilizing: precisely,
if the steady state is globally stable under laissez faire, the introduction of the tax
makes cycles possible. On the other hand, such a tax has negative welfare eﬀects as
it depresses output growth along the transitional adjustment path. These results
are at odds with the general presumption that policies aimed at raising private sav-
ing (and, therefore, at expanding the resource base of the economy) foster higher
growth.4
Although our model is rather stylized, it provides some insights on the role of
stabilization policy in fast-growing economies falling into prolonged periods of low
or no growth. Consider, for instance, the so-called East Asian tigers and Japan.
In recent years these economies have experienced recurrent slumps and are still
struggling to ﬁnd a way out of stagnation. The issue of the policy requirements
needed to resume sustained growth has been widely debated among economists (see
e.g. Crafts (1999), Dornbusch (1995) and Ito (1996)). Most of these studies focus on
the need for ﬁnancial and structural reforms as pre-requisites to resume sustained
growth in the long run. Also, there is a general agreement among researchers that
the high saving rates of East Asian and Japanese economies are an impediment
to their full economic recovery. Indeed, with proﬁtability depressed very little of
the relatively large share of income that is saved is eventually invested; moreover,
high saving depresses domestic consumption. Also, standard expansionary ﬁscal
and monetary policies seem unable to trigger enough stimulus in aggregate demand
4As mentioned earlier, there are few papers in the R&D literature that emphasise the role
of subsidies to R&D in promoting economic growth. For instance, Davidson and Segerstrom
(1998) distinguish between the role of innovative R&D and imitative R&D, and conclude that
subsidising innovative R&D promote growth while subsidising imitative R&D can be detrimental
to growth. General R&D subsidies, on the other hand, always exhert positive eﬀects on growth.
Similar conclusions are reached by Segerstrom (2000) where the emphasis is between vertical versus
horizontal innovation. Even though our paper is not directly comparable with this strand of the
literature, in that we adopt the most simple model of innovation and look at diﬀerent issues (i.e.
macroeconomic stabilization), it is interesting to note the similarities in the policy implications of
the two approaches.
4and investment. Our model suggests that transferring resources from consumers to
innovators may help to overcome economic stagnation and resume sustained growth.
Finally, an interesting feature of the model developed here is that stabiliza-
tion not only brings higher average growth, but also higher welfare. In Deneckere
and Judd (1992) and Matsuyama (1999) no welfare analysis is provided, whereas
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) ﬁnd that, along equilibrium cycles, higher average
growth is accompanied by lower welfare. In their set up, however, social welfare
corresponds to the utility of an inﬁnitely lived representative consumer, and the
stationary (or acyclical) equilibrium trajectory falls in the ’Solow regime’ region
with factor accumulation and no innovation. In our model, stabilization brings
higher welfare because the economy ends up in a stable equilibrium characterized
by innovation and sustained growth (i.e. in a ’Romer regime’ region), where the
amount of resources available for consumption of both young and old is higher than
under equilibrium cycles (and laissez faire).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic
features of the model. In Section 3 we derive the equilibrium dynamics, while in
Section 4 we present our main results. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of propositions
are relegated in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Time is discrete, t =0 ,1,2,.... Agents live for two periods. When young they
work and receive an income wtL, and pay (or receive) a lump sum tax (subsidy)
Bt, whereas when old they use all their savings for consumption. wt represents the
real wage, L is the exogenously ﬁxed labor supply, and the population growth rate
is zero. The utility function, Ut, of the representative consumer of each generation
is given by Ut =l n c1t + 1
1+ρ lnc2t+1 where 0 < ρ < 1 is the subjective rate of
time preferences, c1t is the consumption when young and c2t+1 is the consumption
5when old. Maximizing utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint,5 c1t+
c2t+1
1+rt+1 = wtL + Bt yields, a simple saving function, St
St = s(wtL + Bt) . (1)
where s = 1
2+ρ is the equilibrium saving rate.
Along the lines of Matsuyama (1999), we assume that in this economy there is
one ﬁnal good, taken as numeraire, which is competitively produced, and is either
consumed or invested. The part invested is converted into a variety of diﬀerentiated
intermediate products, and associated with labor (exogenously ﬁxed) according
to a Cobb-Douglas technology. The intermediate products are aggregated into a
symmetric CES technology. The ﬁnal goods production function is then given by










where xt(z) is the intermediate input of variety z ∈ [0,N t]a n dσ ∈ (1,∞)i st h e
elasticity of substitution between each pair of intermediate goods. Notice that: the
technology (2) satisﬁes constant returns to scale for a given availability of interme-
diates, Nt; and that the parameter 1
σ is the labor share of income, since wtL = Yt
σ .
Turning to the speciﬁcation of the intermediate goods, xc
t represents the interme-
diate input produced in the competitive sector (with no innovation), and xm
t the
intermediate input produced by the monopolistic innovative sector. It is assumed
that from period 0 to period t−1 only ’old’ intermediate goods are available in the
market. The variety z ∈ [0,N t−1] is produced under perfect competition by con-
verting a units of capital into one unit of an intermediate, and is competitively sold
at its marginal cost, i.e. pc
t = art. Between t−1a n dt a range of ’new’ intermediate
goods z ∈ [Nt−1,N t] may be introduced. In this case, the variety z ∈ [Nt−1,N t]
is produced and sold exclusively by the respective innovators in period t.I n n o v a -
tors operate under monopolistic competition with no barriers to entry, and enjoy
5The real interest rate is denoted by r.
6monopoly rents only for one period. New intermediate goods are produced by using
a units of capital per unit of output and require F units of capital per variety and




. Since, in this model, capital is the un-consumed
ﬁn a lg o o d ,a n dt h eﬁnal good is the numeraire, from now on we set rt =1 .
We depart from Matsuyama (1999) by assuming that innovators can be either
taxed or subsidized. Hence, the proﬁt function of an innovator operating in period








t + F] − Tt−1
where Tt−1 > 0( Tt−1 < 0) is a lump sum tax (subsidy) set by the government at the
outset of period t (end of period t−1). Since there are no barriers to entry, net proﬁt
must be zero at all times, implying that ’new’ intermediate products (Nt >N t−1)
are introduced if and only if xm
t ≥
(σ−1)
a (F + Tt−1) . Note that if innovators receive
a lump sum subsidy (or pay a lump sum tax) the eﬀect is clearly to increase (or
reduce) the incentive to enter by potential innovators. Demands for intermediate
inputs come from the maximization of the ﬁnal good proﬁt function, taking into
account that all intermediate goods enter symmetrically into the production of the
ﬁnal good, i.e. xt(z) ≡ xc
t for z ∈ [0,N t−1]a n dxt(z) ≡ xm



















































where θ ∈ (1,e=2 .71..). This is a parameter related to the monopoly margin of
the innovator (i.e. 1
σ−1). Thus, when σ is close to one θ → 1, and when σ →∞ ,
7θ → e. Using the above relationships, the economy resource constraint on capital
in period t is,6
Kt−1 = Nt−1(ax
c
t)+( Nt − Nt−1)(ax
m
t + F + Tt−1). (5)






whereas when Nt >N t−1 (i.e. innovation), by substituting the expressions for
demand, (3) and (4), into the economy resource constraint on capital, we get,







´ − θNt−1 .
Letting kt ≡ Kt
θσFNt we obtain an expression governing the introduction of new
products,











The critical point at which innovation starts to be proﬁtable is kcr ≡ 1+
Tt−1
F .
In a symmetric equilibrium, total output, as in (2), is equal to















Using the demand for the intermediate inputs, (3) and (4), the reduced form aggre-










σ Kt−1 , (7)
while for Nt >N t−1 the reduced aggregate production function becomes
Yt = At−1Kt−1 (8)
6Kt−1 denotes the capital stock available at the beginning of period t. It corresponds to the















. Note that under laissez faire, Tt−1 =0 ,







σ (as in Matsuyama (1999)). The reduced form aggregate
production of the ﬁnal good is of the ’AK’ type if Nt >N t−1 as in expression (8).
Therefore, if the resource base of the economy is large enough, kt−1 ≥ kcr,n e w
products are introduced and the economy evolves according to a ’Romer regime’. If
the resource base is not large enough, no innovation takes place and the aggregate
production function (i.e. expression (7)) exhibits decreasing returns to capital.
Hence the economy evolves according to a ’Solow regime’.
As shown in the section below, the equilibrium dynamics of the model simpliﬁes
to a non-linear one-dimensional diﬀerence equation, well deﬁn e di nt h ef o r w a r d
direction of time. The analysis of this one-dimensional equation (evaluation of the
steady state and its stability properties)a l l o w su st os t u d yt h ee v o l u t i o no ft h e
economy between the two regimes within a single growth process.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics and Steady State
To derive the dynamic equilibrium we need to specify how capital accumulation
evolves over time. At equilibrium, saving equals investment, St = Kt, and the
government balances the budget, Bt =( Nt − Nt−1)Tt−1. The latter expression
implies that the lump sum tax on innovators at the outset of period t (Tt−1 > 0)
is redistributed to the consumers in the form of a lump sum subsidy. Equivalently,
lump sum taxes levied on the consumers (Tt−1 < 0) ﬁnance the subsidy distributed




+ s(Nt − Nt−1)Tt−1 .
Substituting for Nt−Nt−1 from (6) and Yt from either (7) or (8) into the expression




























Dividing both sides of the above expression by θσFN t, the forward perfect foresight
dynamics of the system can be expressed as a one-dimensional map in k, Λ: <+ →
<+,
kt = Λ(kt−1) ≡ G(kt−1)
1− 1
σ (9)
if kt−1 ≤ kcr









































if kt−1 ≥ kcr
where G ≡ sA
σ represents the growth potential of the economy at the laissez faire
equilibrium.
We proceed by ﬁrst studying the equilibrium properties of the steady state under
laissez faire.7 Table 1 below summarizes the stability properties of the steady state
under laissez faire.
Solow Romer










Table 1 - Steady State (SS) properties under laissez faire
The occurrence of two-period cycles depends on technology parameter values. Note,




¢1−σ implying θ ∈ (1,e ).
7Setting Tt−1 = 0 the dynamical system (9)-(10) is equivalent to that of Matsuyama (1996).
10This parameter measures the extent to which the innovator loses market power if he
or she waits until the goods that he or she is competing with become competitively
priced. If intermediate goods are poor substitutes, the rate of obsolescence is high.
This triggers innovation. As intermediate goods become more substitutable the
economy may ﬂuctuate between periods of positive innovation and zero innovation.
As substitutability of intermediate inputs increases the system switches to a regime
with no innovation at all. Low values of θ and suﬃciently high values of G imply
an oscillatory convergence to a balanced growth path with innovation, whereas
suﬃciently small values of G imply a monotonic convergence to a stationary path
with factor accumulation and no innovation. For θ > 2( i m p l y i n gσ > 2) there
exists a range of values of G such that the equilibrium growth path of the economy
ﬂuctuates between a phase of capital accumulation and no innovation and a phase
of no factor accumulation and innovation.8
We are now well equipped to address the main issue of our investigation, that
is, to evaluate the growth and welfare eﬀects of policies aimed at eliminating ﬂuc-
tuations.
4 Stabilization
First, note that in the ’Solow regime’ where the economy monotonically converges
to the steady state there is clearly no scope for stabilization. We focus therefore on
equilibrium dynamics situated in the ’Romer regime’.
Fluctuations are generally not seen as beneﬁcial for the economy. Ideally, na-
tions would like to avoid a growth pattern characterized by upswings and downturns
in output growth. Moreover, they would aim at reaching high permanent growth.
In other words, they would aim at reaching a balanced growth path where there is
enough innovation and, at the same time avoid cycles. In our model, this implies
ensuring that: (i) the economy will be situated in the Romer regime where inno-
8The empirical plausibility of the conditions for cycles is discussed in Matsuyama (1999), and
we refer the reader to Section 4 of his paper.
11vation is the engine of growth, rather than in the Solow regime with no innovation
and factor accumulation; (ii) in the event of cycles, policy should aim at bringing
the system on a balanced growth path where the economy grows (G>1), rather
than on a balanced growth path where the economy stays stationary (G<1).
To achieve a diﬀerent dynamic allocation with respect to the case of laissez faire,
the government has, in principle, a variety of policy options. We choose to focus on
the non-distortive option of re-allocating resources between agents by implementing
an appropriate system of subsidies to the innovators ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes
on the consumer or vice versa. This, combined with the assumption of balanced
budget, implies that we can focus on purely stabilizing/destabilizing eﬀects of policy
and not on policy that aﬀects the steady state as well. In particular, we assume
that policy makers follow the following simple stabilization principle,
Tt−1 = γ(k
∗∗ − kt−1),i f k t−1 <k
∗∗ (11)
where the parameter γ represents the size of the government intervention. This
principle implies that the government intervenes only in the case of recessions, and
can be interpreted as a stylized representation of a countercyclical policy rule. In
particular if, at the end of period t − 1 (i.e. outset of period t), the government
observes a deviation of k from its long run trend, it may decide either to redistribute
income to the consumer by means of a lump sum tax on the innovators (γ > 0) or,
to subsidize the innovators by taxing the consumer (γ < 0).9
Suppose that kt−1 <k ∗∗. The government then decides that in order to increase
output growth in the ﬁnal good sector, innovators are to be subsidized by levying a
lump sum tax on the young consumers. The rationale for such a move is to create
9Note that our policy rule (11) does not aim at managing short run recessions,
as our set up is concerned with low frequency movements in macroeconomic variables.
(11) implies that, whenever the economy experiences a long wave of low or no growth
(i.e. a slump), the government intervenes by implementing a simple balanced-budget tax rule.
Considering that the length of the cycle implied by our model is twenty/twenty ﬁve years, the
assumption of a balanced budget rule is not implausible. Indeed, it reﬂects the behaviour of many
governments that aim at balancing the budget over the medium-run, while they may allow budget
deﬁcits to control short run business cycles.
12an incentive for the innovators to produce new intermediate products which foster
higher production of the ﬁnal good. This implies in turn higher consumption of the
representative consumer once old. Similarly, the case of a tax levied on innovators
and redistributed to the young consumer reduces the potential growth of the ﬁnal
good. This implies in turn lower consumption by the representative consumer once
old. To verify the validity of this conjecture in this particular economy we need to
study the eﬀects of implementing the rule above on the stability properties of the
equilibrium.
When kt−1 ≤ kcr (i.e. ’Solow regime’) the dynamics remains the same as de-
scribed by (9). When kcr ≤ kt−1 ≤ k∗∗ (i.e. ’Romer regime’) by substituting Tt−1
by the proposed rule, i.e. (11),10 into (10) the dynamics becomes,







































When kt−1 ≥ k∗∗ the dynamics remains the same as in (10).
By construction, the steady state solution of (12) gives the same steady state
value of k as in the laissez faire equilibrium, i.e. k∗∗. The dynamics of adjustment,
on the other hand, diﬀers. Note that the expression (12) cannot be diﬀerentiated
at k∗∗ (indeed Λ has a kink at k∗∗), implying that Λ0(k∗∗)d o e sn o te x i s t .H o w e v e r ,





































G . Therefore, for any inﬁnitely small neighborhood of the









13steady state the slope of the dynamics changes. Indeed, as discussed in Section
2, the introduction of a lump sum tax/subsidy changes the critical point at which
the economy moves from growth driven by factor accumulation to growth driven
by innovation. Taxing innovators and subsidizing the consumer lowers the growth
potential of the ﬁnal output. Figure 1 gives an example of the changes in the
transitional adjustment path. It also illustrates that this policy, which is aimed at
stabilizing the economy, may on the contrary exert a destabilizing eﬀect. If (as in
Figure 1) the steady state is globally stable under laissez faire, the introduction of
at a xm a k e sc y c l e sp o s s i b l e .
Turning to the welfare properties, we consider a social welfare function linear in



















where the utility of the old generation at time zero is taken as exogenous. Replacing
c1t and c2t+1 by the consumer optimal choices, c1t =( 1−s
s )St =( 1 + ρ)St and































l n 2 . A ss h o w ni nt h e
Appendix, if we evaluate the social welfare function, (14), at the laissez faire equi-
librium and along the equilibrium cycle, it turns out that a subsidy to consumers
ﬁnanced by a tax on innovators reduces social welfare.
The following propositions summarize the results related to the implementation
of the tax on innovators.
Proposition 1 (Stability properties of the steady state under tax on innovators).
If G>θ−1 there is a γ∗ > 0, such that for any γ > γ∗ and for any kcr <k t−1 <k ∗∗,
Λ0
−(k∗∗) < −1. The steady state is unstable and there are equilibrium cycles of period
two.
14kt






Figure 1: The graph of Λ(kt−1)f o rγ > 0a n d G>θ − 1
Proof: See appendix.
Increasing γ as a means to stabilize downward ﬂuctuations in output leads to
equilibrium cycles. Hence it is highly destabilizing. In particular, as γ crosses γ∗,a
ﬂip bifurcation occurs: the steady state looses stability and a stable cycle of period
two appears.11
Proposition 2 (Growth and Welfare properties under tax on innovators)
(i) The average growth rate of the economy over the two-period cycles under a tax
on innovators is lower than the average growth rate of the economy under laissez
faire in the ’Romer regime’. (ii) Welfare under a tax on innovators is lower than
welfare under laissez faire in the ’Romer regime’.
Proof:S e ea p p e n d i x .
11To check for the stability properties of the two-period cycle we have simulated the model.
These simulations suggest that the cycle remains stable for a wide range of parameter values.
15Propositions 1 and 2 establish that implementing a tax on innovators whose
receipts are redistributed to the consumer is detrimental for the economy. The
basic intuition is that reallocating resources from the innovators to the consumer
aﬀects the balance between the two engines of growth, i.e. factor accumulation and
innovation. As the subsidy to the consumer ﬁnanced through the lump sum tax on
the innovators increases, the economy moves from a situation in which innovation is
highly proﬁtable to one in which innovation is less proﬁtable. This implies that, as
the economy moves closer to a regime with no innovation and stationary growth it
can be trapped in a phase where it cycles between high innovation (and low factor
accumulation) and low innovation (and high factor accumulation). This depresses
output growth along the equilibrium adjustment path and, in turn, reduces social
welfare.
However, if the government chooses the alternative option of taxing the young
consumer and redistributing the receipts to the innovators as a lump sum subsidy
the results are reversed. Figure 2 gives an example of the changes of the transitional
adjustment path. It illustrates that this policy has a stabilizing eﬀect on the econ-
omy. Under laissez faire the steady state is unstable and a two-period cycle emerges
between the two growth regimes. As shown, the introduction of a subsidy stabilizes
the economy in that the system converges towards the steady state. Fluctuations
disappear and output growth is high along the equilibrium adjustment path.12
The next propositions summarize the results related to the implementation of
the subsidy on innovators.
Proposition 3 (Stability properties of the steady state under subsidy on innova-
tors).
If G<θ − 1 there is a γ∗ < 0, such that for any − F
k∗∗ < γ < γ∗ and for any
kcr <k t−1 <k ∗∗, 0 < Λ0
−(k∗∗) < 1. The economy monotonically converges towards
the steady state in the ’Romer regime’ .
12To ensure 0 <k cr < 1w ei m p o s eγ > −F
k∗∗ (cf. footnote 10).
16kt





Figure 2: The graph of Λ(kt−1)f o rγ < 0, 1 <G<θ − 1a n dΛ(kcr) < Λ(k∗∗).
Proof:S e ea p p e n d i x .
Recall that, in this set up, the subsidy payed to innovators corresponds to a
tax levied on young consumers. Hence, the term −γ <F / k ∗∗ (where γ < 0) in
proposition 3 identiﬁes an upper limit to the size of the government intervention
and, therefore, to the size of the tax/subsidy implemented. Substituting for k∗∗,
as given in Table 1, such an upper bound corresponds to −γ < F
G−1
θ +1,w h e r e




¢σ−1 with θ > 2. It can be easily computed13 that
the lowest level of this upper bound is F/2. The latter is higher the higher the
cost of innovation, F.W h e n F is high, the proﬁtability of innovation activity is
low. To bring the economy out of a low growth cycle into a high growth innovation-
driven equilibrium path, the government will need to implement relatively large
tax/subsidy. If, on the contrary, F is relatively low, the size of the intervention
13As 1 <G<θ −1a n dθ > 2, then 1 <G<θ −1 ⇔ F
2(1− 1
θ) < Fθ
G−1+θ <F.A l s o ,s i n c eθ > 2,
1
2 < 1 − 1
θ < 1 ⇐⇒ F
2 < F
2(1− 1
θ) <F. Hence, −γ < F
2 .
17does not need to be too large.
Turning now to welfare, a policy of subsidizing innovators (although ﬁnanced
by taxing young consumers) has positive eﬀe c t si nt h a ti tp r o m o t e so u t p u tg r o w t h
along the transitional adjustment path which, in turn, leads to higher social welfare.
Proposition 4 (Growth and Welfare properties under subsidy on innovators)
For any − F
k∗∗ < γ < γ∗, (i) The average growth rate of the economy under subsidy
on innovators is higher than the average growth rate of the economy under laissez
faire;(ii) Welfare under subsidy on innovators is higher than welfare under laissez
faire in the ’Romer regime’.
Proof:S e ea p p e n d i x .
The basic intuition is as follows. Consider that the economy is in the ’Romer
regime’ and that, under laissez faire, it exhibits equilibrium two-period cycles be-
tween the two growth regimes. Hence a period of low growth (i.e. kL <k ∗∗),
corresponding to an equilibrium {kL,k H}situated in the Solow regime and to an
increase in saving (i.e. Λ(kL) > Λ(k∗∗)), is followed by a period of high growth (i.e.
kH >k ∗∗) corresponding to an equilibrium in the ’Romer’ regime. This is due to the
a-synchronization between innovation and investment activities that characterizes
this model (see Introduction). In fact when saving increases, while the equilibrium
is in the low growth regime (i.e. the ’Solow’ regime), more resources are directed
to the production of ’old’ intermediate goods to the detriment of the innovative
sector which becomes less proﬁtable. This eﬀect is reversed in the following period.
If, however, saving were directed towards innovation, prolonged sustained growth
is possible. Therefore, a policy aimed at taxing the young and distributing the
proceeds to the innovators allows the economy to remain in the ’Romer’ regime and
achieve stability. It also increases the amount of goods available for both young
and old. As a result, total welfare in the economy is higher. In other words, in our
economy reallocating resources from the consumer to innovators aﬀects the proper-
ties of the balanced growth path of the ﬁnal output. More precisely, the economy
18switches from an equilibrium in which it cycles between high innovation (and low
factor accumulation) and low innovation (and high factor accumulation), to the
regime with innovation and sustained growth. In the latter, resources would not
be devoted to the production of ’old’ products and the economy would smoothly
converge to higher sustained (stable) growth.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have presented an OLG economy exhibiting sustained growth
through the implementation of a simple redistribution principle (i.e., subsidies to
innovative sectors ﬁnanced by a lump sum tax on young consumers). The OLG
structure makes it possible to: (i) account for the duration of innovation driven
cycles, typically longer than high frequency short run business cycles, (ii) study
the dynamic properties of the economy by use of a one-dimensional map, which
makes the analysis simple and straightforward, (iii) explain how the reallocation of
resources between sectors and consumers aﬀects the generational exchanges.
Taxing the young and redistributing the proceeds to the innovative sectors brings
stability and increases the amount of goods available for both generations; hence
it also increases total welfare of the economy. This suggests that fast-growing
economies, in which high factor accumulation plays a crucial role alongside innova-
tive sectors that enjoy temporary monopoly rents, should follow rather unorthodox
policies when they are facing economic slumps.
19APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
By direct inspection of (13): (i) Λ0
−(k∗∗) < Λ0
LF(k∗∗), and (ii) Λ0
−(k∗∗)i sd e -
creasing in γ.
To proof existence we follow Mastuyama (1999). Recall ﬁrst that Λ0
−(k∗∗) <
−1 < Λ0
LF(k∗∗). For a period-2 cycle to exist it suﬃces to show that H(k) ≡
Λ2(k) − k = 0 has a solution other than k = k∗∗. Since (see Fig. 3 at the end of
the Appendix), [Λ2(kcr), Λ(kcr)] is in the trapping region, H[Λ2(kcr)] = Λ4(kcr) −
Λ2(kcr) ≥ 0a n dH(kcr)=Λ2(kcr) − kcr < 0, hence, H(kcr) = 0 has a solution in
[Λ2(k), kcr].¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume kt−2 = kH, kt−1 = kL, kt = kH, kt+1 = kL, kt+2 = kH and so on, where
kL is situated in the ’Romer regime’ and kH is situated in the ’Solow regime’ (see,
e.g., Figure 1 in Section 4). This assumption implies that under our policy rule, see
(11), Tt−2 =0 ,Tt−1 = γ(k∗∗ − kL), Tt =0 ,Tt+1 = γ(k∗∗ − kL)a n ds oo n .
(i) In view of the above, and given the dynamics as in (9)-(10), the rates of
growth of all relevant variables when the economy ﬂuctuates every other period




















































































































.G if kH <k
∗∗
Under laissez faire, k>k cr,a n dt h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fo u t p u ti sgYRomer = G;w h i l e
under taxes on innovators, kL <k cr <k H, and the average growth rate of output






To demonstrate that the average growth rate is higher under laissez faire than
over the cycle it suﬃces to show that (kL)− 1
2σ < 1. This condition is always veriﬁed
since, under the tax on innovators, the critical point moves from a value of 1 to a
value strictly higher than one, implying kL > 1a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,( kL)− 1
2σ < 1. ¥
(ii) Welfare under laissez faire in the ’Romer regime’. It is given by the social
welfare function (14) evaluated at the laissez faire equilibrium, k∗∗ = G−1
θ +1 ,i . e .































where S∗∗ = s
σY ∗∗ is evaluated at the steady state k∗∗.
Welfare under taxes on innovators. Since the economy ﬂuctuates every other






















21where SSolow = s
σY ∗ and SRomer = s
σY ∗∗ are evaluated at their respective steady
state, k∗ and k∗∗.






























The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of this equality is positive since at equilibrium (with
kH >k ∗∗ >k cr), ln S∗∗
SRomer =l n( gYRomer)=l nG>0. Since kL <k cr <k ∗∗,t h es i g n
of the second term on the r.h.s. depends on the sign of the growth rate over the
two-period cycle, i.e., ln S∗∗
SSolow =l n ( gYTax)=l n G(kL)
− 1
2σ. The latter is positive
as long as G(kL)
− 1
2σ > 1, which is equivalent to kL <G 2σ. To demonstrate that
the latter inequality is veriﬁed, ﬁrst, recall that σ ∈ (1,∞) and that, under the
tax on innovators, the critical point moves from a value of 1 to a value strictly
higher than one implying, 1 <k L <k ∗∗. Hence, if we can show that k∗∗ <G 2 ,
it also follows that kL <G 2σ. By use of the expression for k∗∗ we get, k∗∗ − G2 =
(G − 1)(1/θ − 1 − G) < 0s i n c eG>1a n dθ ∈ (1,2.71). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us note that for any γ > − F
k∗∗, kcr < 1 <k ∗∗. Therefore, if Λ is in-
creasing in k in the Romer regime, then Λ(kcr) < Λ(1) < Λ(k∗∗). I na d d i t i o n ,
for any k ∈ (kcr,k∗∗),Λ(k) >kthen kt+1 = Λ(kt) >k t and the economy
monotonically converges to the steady state- see Figure 2. Formally, it suﬃces
to show that 0 < Λ0

































In fact, by simple manipulations, and substituting for G−1
θ =( k∗∗ − 1), the lat-







G < 0, which is always true since





























> 0, which is always
veriﬁed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Here, we assume that under laissez faire the economy exhibits equilibrium two-
period cycles, with kL < 1 <k ∗∗ <k H,a n dw h e r ekL is situated in the ’Solow
regime’ and kH is situated in the ’Romer regime’(see Figure 2 in section 4). As
for the case of taxes on innovators (cf. proof of Proposition 2) we assume that the
economy starts at kt−1 = kL, implying that a subsidy Tt−1 = γ(k∗∗ − kL), with
γ > − F
k∗∗, is implemented at the outset of period t.
(i) From the section devoted to the proof of Proposition 2, we know the ex-
pressions for gY under laissez faire and under subsidy/tax. Hence, gYLF − gYSub =
(gYSolow.gYRomer)
1





















































lower than one since γ > − F
k∗∗. Compare, now, the r.h.s of the inequality with







. Since we have assumed G<θ − 1u n d e r










> 1 ⇐⇒ k
− 1
σ
L > 1, which is always true since kL < 1. Therefore gYLF <g YSub.
¥
(ii) To sign the welfare eﬀects, it is convenient to derive ﬁrst the expres-
sions for the average growth rates over the two period cycle at the outset of
period t. Recalling that kt−1 = kL and Tt−1 = γ(k∗∗ − kL), and by use of the
expressions for the growth rates derived in the section devoted to the proof of




























Welfare under laissez faire in the ’Romer regime’. Under laissez faire the econ-























where SRomer = s
σY ∗∗ and SSolow = s
σY ∗ are evaluated at their respective steady
state, k∗∗ and k∗.
Welfare under subsidies on innovators. In this case, kcr <k L < 1 <k ∗∗, and the
economy monotonically converges towards the steady state in the ’Romer regime’





































where SkL,t = s
σYt, with Yt = At−1Kt−1 (cf. (8)) and t =0 ,1,...,n − 1.









































































σ > 1. The l.h.s. of this inequality is always higher
than one since G>1a n d0< 1+
γ
F(k∗∗ − kL) < 1; hence, ln
YL
YRomer > 0.
Moreover, since the economy monotonically converges towards the equilibrium k∗∗,
ln
YL
YRomer > 0i ss a t i s ﬁed for any kL,2t,w i t ht =0 ,1,...,n − 1. T u r n i n gt ol n
YkL+1
YSolow,







σ > 1. The l.h.s. of this inequality
is always higher than one since G>1, kL < 1a n d0< 1+
γ
F(k∗∗ −kL) < 1; hence,
ln
YkL+1
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2(kcr)- kcr <0 
Λ
2(kcr)- kcr >0 
1 − = t t k k
Figure 3: Period-2 cycles, γ > 0a n dG>θ − 1
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